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Optimizely, supply chain attack, JavaScript, Magecart, card skimming, CNN, BBC, Salesforce, Scott Helme, PCI DSS, CSP

Optimizely Supply Chain Attack Hit CNN, BBC, Salesforce Sites

The Optimizely supply chain attack injected a card skimmer, crypto stealer and iOS exploits into scripts on CNN, BBC and Salesforce sites. What to do.

The Optimizely supply chain attack injected malicious JavaScript into Optimizely scripts loaded by sites including CNN, BBC, Fox News, Salesforce, Zoom and GitLab on November 16. Attackers abused a flaw in Optimizely's Experimentation signup flow to add code that skimmed payment cards, swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses and loaded iOS exploit kits. Optimizely says the flaw is fixed and the injected code removed.

Optimizely is a website experimentation and personalization platform. Customers load its JavaScript on their own pages, so whoever can edit a customer's Optimizely project can run code on that customer's site. Optimizely told BleepingComputer that an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. It blocked the vulnerable path, deployed a fix, removed the code, ended sessions, revoked tokens and reset affected accounts.

Security researcher Scott Helme found the attack. His team analyzed 1,611 Optimizely scripts and found 188 infected files belonging to 178 organizations. BleepingComputer confirmed through urlscan.io records that the payload loaded, or tried to load, on sites including Zoom, KLM, GitLab, BBC, CNN, Smartsheet, Stamps.com, Salesforce, Fox News, Air France, Change.org, Bitly and UNICEF USA. Salesforce said it disabled Optimizely scripts across preview and production instances while it investigates.

What did the malicious Optimizely script do?

The injected code loaded a second-stage script from 1688360[.]cc, either directly or through a Base64-encoded URL, with a fallback that ran an embedded copy if the remote script was blocked.

Capability

What it did

Payment card skimming

Captured card numbers, expiry dates and security codes typed into pages

Crypto wallet swapping

Replaced wallet addresses on pages with attacker addresses

iOS exploit delivery

Loaded the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits against older iOS versions

Data collection

Grabbed cookies, page URLs and screenshots

Helme found the wallets had received about $7,000 by November 16, though some were active before the attack. The earliest injection he observed was early on November 16, and by 21:52 UTC only one of the 188 files still held malicious code. How long the signup flaw existed, and how many visitors were exposed, is not yet known.

Was I affected by the Optimizely hack?

If you visited an affected site on November 16 and entered card details, watch your statements and contact your card issuer about anything unfamiliar. If you sent cryptocurrency that day, check the destination addresses. iPhone and iPad users should install the latest iOS or iPadOS update, since the exploit kits target older versions.

What should website owners do about third-party script risk?

If you run Optimizely, review your projects for unexpected code changes since November 16 and confirm the account cleanup Optimizely describes. More broadly, a Content Security Policy that limits where scripts can load from and send data to would have blocked the request to 1688360[.]cc. Subresource Integrity hashes do not help much with experimentation tools, because their scripts change whenever an experiment does, so keep these tags off checkout and logged-in application pages where you can. For payment pages, PCI DSS v4.0 requirements 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 already require an inventory of authorized scripts and detection of unauthorized changes. This attack is exactly what those controls exist to catch.

Our read

Third-party scripts run with the same power as your own code, and every vendor whose JavaScript you load is part of your attack surface. The entry point here was an account signup flaw in someone else's platform, outside your own code. What testing can catch is your exposure to it: which third-party scripts run on sensitive pages, and whether your CSP would stop a rogue request. The controls that help are evidence-based: an inventory of what scripts run on your pages, change detection on them, and a CSP you have actually tested. That is compliance as evidence rather than a checkbox. Earlier web-facing cases include the global CMS exploitation campaign and malicious LiteLLM releases. Our guide to software supply chain attacks explains the pattern, and Nexus Void's VAPT for web apps checks client-side script exposure and CSP as part of testing.

Reporting by BleepingComputer; research by Scott Helme; PCI requirements per the PCI Security Standards Council.

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