Critical
ConnectWise, ScreenConnect, SCKit, CVE-2026-84869, RMM+, MSP, CISA KEV, RelayTrap, Huntress, remote access

ScreenConnect SCKit Attacks Continue: Update to 26.6.5 Now
ScreenConnect SCKit attacks abuse the RMM+ extension and CVE-2026-84869 (CVSS 9.9, KEV) to reach MSP technicians. Update to 26.6.5 and hunt now.
ConnectWise says ScreenConnect SCKit attacks are still hitting on-premises servers that have not disabled the compromised third-party extensions or updated. The SCKit toolkit abuses an authentication flaw in the RMM+ extension and can spread to MSP technicians through CVE-2026-84869, a CVSS 9.9 ScreenConnect client flaw already in CISA's KEV catalog. Update the client to 26.6.5 or later and disable the extensions now.
ConnectWise said on Monday that it has completed its investigation into unauthorized access to partner ScreenConnect environments, The Hacker News reports. Activity continues against on-premises servers where the identified extensions remain enabled. ConnectWise has disabled five extensions across 400 partner environments: Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link. Having them installed does not by itself mean an environment was compromised, and ConnectWise asks partners not to re-enable them until it issues further guidance.
Huntress and Blackpoint Cyber reported last week that attackers were exploiting an authentication flaw in RMM+ versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 to run commands while bypassing ScreenConnect's normal authentication. The payload is SCKit, a multi-component toolkit. Huntress saw another spike on November 13 affecting 205 hosts across 41 organizations.
How does SCKit spread to MSP technicians?
Through a C# module called RelayTrap. When a technician connects to an infected customer device to investigate, RelayTrap exploits CVE-2026-84869 to run code on the technician's own workstation, which can then reach other managed networks. For an MSP, that could turn one compromised customer into a route to others. There is no evidence the worm-like spread has succeeded in the latest campaign.
Detail | Value |
|---|---|
Client flaw | CVE-2026-84869, CVSS 9.9 (CWE-269), fixed in 26.6.5 |
CISA KEV | Added September 11, 2026 |
EPSS | 1.2% (68th percentile) |
Entry point | Auth flaw in RMM+ extension 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 |
Spread module | RelayTrap.cs, targets technician workstations |
Huntress spike, Nov 13 | 205 hosts, 41 organizations |
Rogue client host | 185.241.211[.]197 (1337 Services GmbH) |
Persistence | Service named "Windows Update Agent" running UpdateConnect.ClientService.exe as LocalSystem |
The EPSS score undersells this one. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation at about 1%, yet the flaw is confirmed exploited and SCKit is built to use it. When KEV and EPSS disagree, KEV wins.
What should ScreenConnect partners do now?
Update every ScreenConnect technician client to 26.6.5 or later, following ConnectWise's advisories. Disable the five extensions on on-premises servers and leave them off. Extensions installed years ago for a pilot are easy to forget, so inventory every server rather than assuming. Then hunt, because ConnectWise warns that disabling extensions and updating does not remove access or persistence already established. Look for ScreenConnect clients you did not deploy, connections to 185.241.211[.]197, and a "Windows Update Agent" service under C:\ProgramData. Huntress's earlier research on rogue ScreenConnect installations covers how to spot clients you did not deploy.
Our read
This is the third act of the same flaw. We covered CVE-2026-84869 when it was disclosed unpatched in September; it went into KEV days later, and two months on, attackers have built a toolkit around it. Remote management tools hold the keys to every customer an MSP manages, and third-party extensions sit inside that trust without the vendor's own review. Inventory every extension on your RMM and remote access servers, and test those servers the way an attacker would. Our CISA KEV guide explains why a low EPSS score never cancels a KEV listing, and the N-able N-central exploitation shows the same pressure on another RMM platform. Nexus Void runs VAPT for networks and internet-facing services, including remote access infrastructure.
Reporting by The Hacker News; CVSS, EPSS and KEV data per NVD, FIRST and CISA; incident data per Huntress and ConnectWise.